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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of drafting the law of war was to maintain peace and 
security around the world. That is why the current legal framework 
prohibits the use of force, except in accordance with the right to self-
defence or with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization.
Yet, this century has been in a perpetual state of war. In the past, there 
have been certain deviations from this proscription on the use of force
through the introduction of notions like ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ and the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), according to which states could use
unilateral force against other states without UNSC authorization or 
without the occurrence of an armed attack, in the face of an ‘imminent 
threat’ to the ‘security of humankind.’ This Article aims to describe and 
assess the unable or unwilling doctrine, which is a framework that has been 
used on a number of occasions to justify a victim state’s use of force against 
a host state in an effort to hunt down non-state perpetrators accused of
waging attacks against the victim state. First, this Article discusses the 
notion of the responsibility to protect, commonly known as R2P, followed by
the unable or unwilling test. Second, this Article discusses how this test
arises and then explores the historic roots of the test. Third, this Article 
details the framework for applying the test, provides examples of real-world 
scenarios in which the test has been applied, and then critiques the 
application of the test in contemporary times. Finally, this Article concludes 
that the test is a broad interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations
(UN) Charter and deviates from the well-established law. However, it has
not shifted the paradigm of law of war, as this test lacks legal conviction in
the opinio juris and state practice and, hence, it is not considered a part 
of customary international law. 
40
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, the international community has effectively used religious,1 
scholarly,2 customary, or contractual writings3 in an attempt to limit human 
suffering, reduce the chaos of wars, and maintain the peace and security 
around the world. The governing law of war has evolved in many phases,4 
from permitting the fight of holy wars,5 to permitting the hunt of terrorists 
who fight wars in the name of religion.6 Similarly, world peace is strained 
where aggressors circumvent these restraints by forcefully initiating national 
and international wars in an attempt to satisfy their need for power and 
wealth.7 Millions of people have been killed and many countries have 
been destroyed throughout the centuries as a result of men fighting wars 
against other men.8 
The UN Charter9 and humanitarian laws10 have evolved as a legal 
framework for war, based largely on the desire to maintain international 
peace and order. These laws attempt to answer convoluted questions such 
as: “is the use of force against civilians justifiable in war?”11 Under the
1. MARK J. ALLMAN, WHO WOULD JESUS KILL?: WAR, PEACE, AND THE CHRISTIAN
TRADITION 121 (Leslie M. Ortiz et al. eds., 2008). 
2. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 317 (Ernest Barker trans., 1971); see also CICERO 
DE OFFICIIS 45 (Walter Miller trans., 1913); see also WASEEM AHMAD QURESHI, THE USE 
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (2017).
3. See generally League of Nations Covenant arts. 1–26; General Treaty for
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 
94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; U.N. Charter. 
4. See generally League of Nations Covenant, supra note 3; Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
supra note 3; U.N. Charter, supra note 3; see also ALLMAN, supra note 1; ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 2; CICERO DE OFFICIIS, supra note 2; QURESHI, supra note 2. 
 5. ALLMAN, supra note 1.
 6. See JAMES CORUM, FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERROR: A COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY 39 (2007).
7. DANIEL BULTMANN, INSIDE CAMBODIAN INSURGENCY: ASOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON CIVIL WARS AND CONFLICT 7–8 (2016).
8. Douglas P. Lackey, Pacifism, in JAMES E. WHITE, CONTEMPORARY MORAL
PROBLEMS: WAR, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE 17 (3d ed. 2008). 
9. See generally U.N. Charter, supra note 3. 
10. See generally The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; 
Rome Statute of the Int. Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. ACONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998). 
11.  Additional Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 13. 
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current legal framework, the use of force is completely prohibited.12 Two 
exceptions to this rule exist: (1) first, where use of force is necessary in 
order to exercise of the right to self-defence;13 and (2) second, where the
use of force is authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC).14 Originally, 
the main purpose for developing the laws of war was to limit the use of 
force and safeguard peace.15 Paradoxically, the previous century has been 
in a perpetual state of war.16 The past couple decades have witnessed
various unilateral uses of force in many countries in the form of humanitarian 
interventions17 and the War on Terror,18 especially against non-state actors
(NSAs) residing in innocent or neutral states, although the law remains 
ambiguous on this issue. Therefore, while briefly exploring the historical 
transformation of the laws of war, this Article seeks to answer three main 
questions. First, whether the law of war is changing in the twenty-first 
century. Next, what the current legal framework says about using force in 
self-defence against NSAs residing in an innocent state. Finally, whether 
the “unwilling and unable test” can be considered part of the current 
customary international law (CIL) of war. 
Accordingly, this Article is divided into five sections. Part I will briefly 
illustrate the historical transformation in the law of war. Part II will then 
describe the current legal framework regarding the use of force under the 
UN Charter. Part III will list certain deviations from the current legal
framework, including anticipatory self-defence, “right to protect” (R2P),
and the “unwilling and unable test.” Subsequently, Part IV will explore 
legal prerequisites applicable to the test. Finally, Part V will analyse whether 
the test can be considered CIL, answering the question of whether the law
of war is changing in the twenty-first century. 
I. HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION
The historical transformation of the law of war can be divided into three 
periods: (1) the just war period from 330 BC to AD 1650; (2) the sovereignty
period from 1700 to 1919; and (3) the international agreements period
from 1919 to 1939.
12.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
13. Id. art. 51.
 14. Id. arts. 39–42. 
15. Id. at pmbl.
16. GAY MORRIS & JENS RICHARD GIERSDORF, CHOREOGRAPHIES OF 21ST CENTURY
WARS 2 (2016).
17. See generally TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION:
THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE (2007).
18. See CORUM, supra note 6.
42
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A. Just War Period (330 BC to AD 1650)
The just war period consists of three phases, namely the “Classical,
Christian and Secular phases.”19 Throughout each phase, the theories and 
practices of different rationales varied with respect to where wars were 
permitted for certain just causes. For instance, during the classical phase 
(330 BC to AD 300), Greek and Roman philosophers,20 including Aristotle21 
and Cicero,22 proclaimed that wars were a means of peace.23 Such philosophers
also considered fighting against slavery,24 fighting to enslave people,25 
and fighting to exercise leadership26 as just causes for waging a war.27 The
Christian phase (AD 300 to AD 1550) followed this approach to just war, 
using the methodology that only a holy war ordained by a divine entity 
permitted the use of force.28  Later, Augustine29 and Aquinas30 developed 
the rules and limitations of using force within this era. In this phase, amending 
wrongs, such as wars of revenge, were considered a just cause to wage a 
war.31 To be considered a permissible justification for waging war,32 such
action required just intentions33 by a rightful leader.34 This requirement
ruled out the possibility of waging holy wars without state authority.35 
Later, in the secular phase (AD 1550–1700), based on Grotius’s works of 
19. WASEEM AHMAD QURESHI, JUST WAR THEORY AND EMERGING CHALLENGES IN
AN AGE OF TERRORISM 34–42 (2017). 
20. QURESHI, supra note 2.
 21. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
 22. See CICERO DE OFFICIIS,  supra note 2, at 83; see also QURESHI, supra note 2.
 23. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2; CICERO DE OFFICIIS, supra note 2, at 83; QURESHI,
supra note 2. 
 24. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 319. 
25. Id.
 26. QURESHI, supra note 2; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 319. 
27. QURESHI, supra note 2; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 2. 
28. ALLMAN, supra note 1.
 29. Wim Smit, Beyond Paralysing Fear and Blind Violence. Terrorism, Counter-
Terrorism and the Violation of Human and Civil Rights, in JUST WAR AND TERRORISM: 
THE END OF THE JUST WAR CONCEPT? 107–09 (Wim Smit ed., Peeters Publishers 2005). 
30. AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 159 (A. P. d’Entrèves ed., J. G. Dawson
trans. 1970). 
31. Id.
 32. Id. at 161. 
33. Id. at 159. 
34. Smit, supra note 29. 
35. AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 30, at 159–61. 
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natural laws, wars were permissible for avenging wrongs,36  in self-defence 
and anticipatory self-defence by  lawful authority.37 In this context, wars
were meant to protect property and lives of people, and anticipatory self-
defence mandated that there be an imminent threat to justify an anticipatory 
use of force.38 In this secular phase, desires for “richer lands,” “freedom” 
(among certain people), and “ruling other people” were considered unjust 
causes for a war.39 
B. Sovereignty Period (1700 to 1919) 
This period introduced the concept of sovereignty. It considered all 
countries to be equal40 to one another and no country was subjected to higher 
laws without their consent.41 In this period, all states could use force at whim,42 
owing to their sovereign rights to wage war43 without any justification.44 
Uses of force short of war45 were frequently used in this era in the form of 
reprisals and self-defence.46 However, the Second Hague Convention prohibited 
the use of force for collecting debts as the only prohibition on using force 
by a state.47 
C. International Agreements Period (1919 to 1939) 
This period includes the Covenant of the League of Nations and the
Kellogg–Briand Pact.  After the consequences of the First World War, “the 
Covenant” (1919 to 1928), signed by 63 member countries,48 posed certain 
restrictions on the use of force.49 Yet, powerful states like the United 
36. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE
OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 15 (Routledge Press 1993) (2014). 
37. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS) 169– 
86 (Louise R. Loomis trans., 1949). 
38. Id. at 173. 
39. Id. at 550–51. 
40. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES
FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51 (2005). 
41. AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 16. 
42. Id. at 17. 
43. DJURA NINCIC, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 52 (1970). 
44. AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 17. 
45. BEOMCHUL SHIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: SHAPING THE
UN CHARTER AND ITS EVOLUTION 122 (Kida Press 2008). 
46. QURESHI, supra note 19, at 45–48. 
47. DIMITRIOS DELIBASIS, THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE: IN INFORMATION
WARFARE OPERATIONS 98 (2007). 
48.  League of Nations Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 1, annex.
 49. JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 52 (2d ed. 2005). 
44
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States (U.S.) remained non-parties to the Covenant.50 The Covenant made 
it mandatory to seek arbitration on disputed matters between states that 
could possibly lead to war,51 and it prohibited the use of force against 
recommendations made by its report or court.52 However, the parties could 
resort to using force in this era if the council did not reach a decision,53 or if
the other parties did not abide by the decision within three months.54 Later, 
the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928 to 1939) completely outlawed 
wars without providing any exceptions to it.55 The notion of self-defence 
and its prerequisites were not defined or understood under this pact, which 
did little to restrict aggressive states and led to the Second World War.56 
II. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Currently, the governing law of war is the UN Charter of 1945, which 
completely prohibits the use of force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter reads,
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”57 However, the UN Charter provides only two exceptions 
to this prohibition on the use of force. The first exception is the use of force
in self-defence. Article 51 of the UN Charter reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.58 
50. KAREN A. J. MILLER, POPULIST NATIONALISM: REPUBLICAN INSURGENCY AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING 1918–1925, at 1 (1999). 
51.  League of Nations Covenant, supra note 3, art. 12. 
 52.  Id. arts. 13, 15. 
53. Id. art. 15.
 54. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 75 (Cambridge University
Press 3d ed. 2001) (1988). 
55. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 3, art. 1–2. 
56. QURESHI, supra note 19, at 55–56. 
57.  U.N. Charter, supra note 3, art. 2, ¶ 4. 
58. Id. art. 51.
 45
QURESHI (WAR) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2020 1:53 PM        
 
 

















       
      
 
    
The second exception to the use of force is through a United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) authorization in accordance with Articles 39-41 of
the UN Charter, in cases of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
act of aggression.”59 Article 39 of the UN Charter reads, “The Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”60 Therefore, presently there is 
no third exception to the prohibition on the use of force against the sovereignty 
of another state. That is why all the unilateral uses of force in the absence 
of self-defence or UNSC authorization are considered illegitimate in accordance 
with the contemporary law of war.61 
III. DEVIATIONS FROM THE FRAMEWORK
For the purposes of this Article, to explore deviations from the current legal
framework, this part will only discuss the notions of pre-emptive self-defence,
“R2P” and the “unwilling or unable test.” 
A. Pre-emptive Self-Defence
The Caroline Test of the nineteenth century, affirmed by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, allowed the pre-emptive use of force in cases of necessary self-
defence against a force that is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation,”62 without the occurrence 
of an actual armed attack. The test acknowledged the right of a State to strike
first in cases of imminent attacks, but required that the use of pre-emptive
force must be necessary and proportional.63 The test essentially means that 
an imminent attack leaves no time for deliberations of using peaceful 
means but the use of force is allowed if it is proportional to the imminent 
threat.64 Since 1967,65 scholars have debated whether presently, the pre-
59. Id. art. 39–41. 
60. Id. art. 39.
 61. SPENCER ZIFCAK, UNITED NATIONS REFORM: HEADING NORTH OR SOUTH? 85 
(2009); see also LEGITIMACY AND DRONES: INVESTIGATING THE LEGALITY, MORALITY AND 
EFFICACY OF UCAVS 28 (Steven J. Barela ed., 2015); THE ARAB SPRING: NEW PATTERNS 
FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (Carlo Panara & Gary Wilson eds., 2013). 
 62. William K. Lietzau, Old Laws, New Wars: Jus ad Bellum in an Age of Terrorism, 8
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 383, 440 (2004). 
63. John F. Murphy, Is US Adherence to the Rule of Law inInternational Affairs Feasible?, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 197, 207 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
64. Lietzau, supra note 62; see also Murphy, supra note 63. 
65. KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE: ESSENCE AND
LIMITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 146–47 (2011). 
46
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emptive use of force is a part of CIL.66 Therefore under this test, states can
resort to the pre-emptive use of force without the occurrence of an armed 
attack in a situation of an imminent threat, but the use of anticipatory force 
must be necessary and proportional in accordance with the test.67 
1. Case Studies 
Aggressive states have used this narrative and started to use force pre-
emptively without the occurrence of an armed attack to respond against
their perceivable “future but imminent” threats. For instance, in 1967 
Israel attacked the United Arab Republic without the occurrence of any 
armed attack.68 In the Security Council debates, Israel argued that an army 
of 80,000 men and 900 tanks was assembling in Sinai to attack Israel.69 
Therefore, Israeli actions were necessary to thwart the imminent aggression 
against it.70 In this debate, Syria maintained that Israel alone was the
aggressor in this situation, and that it had also attacked and bombed Egypt 
and Syria, killing civilians and destroying property, without the occurrence 
of any attack on Israel.71 In the same debate, Morocco argued that the mere 
preparation of military assembly cannot constitute aggression, but the first 
strike rule can.72 The narratives of Syria and Morocco relied on the prohibition 
of the use of force, well maintained under the UN Charter. But the Israeli 
narrative relied only on a letter of a professor.73 Against this, the Soviet
Union responded that it was not a question of research, but a simple matter 
of fact that Israel conducted aggression against its neighbouring Arab 
countries.74 The Soviet Union also maintained that the aggressor is the one 
who strikes first, and therefore Israel was the aggressor in this case.75 Even 
the United States and Britain (which are major supporters of Israel) remained 
66. Id. at 282–83. 
67. Murphy, supra note 63. 
68. AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 76 (referencing Statement of Mr. Eban, U.N. 
Doc. S/OV.1348: 71). 
69. Id.
 70. Id.
 71. Id. at 76. 
72. Id. at 77 (referencing Statement of Mr. Benhima of Morocco, U.N. Doc. S/PV.
1348: 122).
73. Id. (referencing Statement of Mr. Rafel of Israel, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1353: 56–57).
74. Id. (referencing Statement of Mr. Fedorenko of the Soviet Union, U.N. Doc. S/PV.
1351: 76–80).
75. Id. (referencing Statement of Mr. Fedorenko of the Soviet Union, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 
1351: 61). 
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silent on this debate.76 It was overwhelmingly apparent in this debate that 
in practice under CIL, whoever strikes first would be considered an aggressor, 
and there is no room for accommodating anticipatory self-defence. 
Again in 1981, Israel justified its attacks in Iraq by relying on its right
to pre-emptive self-defence based on the theoretical works of Professor
Bowett.77 Israel argued that Iraq was building nuclear weapons, which were 
set to be operational in few days, and Iraq would not hesitate to use them 
against Israel in populated areas.78 Therefore, owing to this imminent threat,
Israel had to use pre-emptive force against Iraqi future aggression. The 
narratives of Iraq,79 Syria,80 Guyana,81 “Pakistan, Spain and Yugoslavia”82 
supported the restricted view that use of force requires an armed attack to
use force in self-defence.83 Therefore, any pre-emptive use of force is
aggression.84 Similarly, Britain argued that Israeli actions were acts of
aggression because there was no armed attack and the Israeli claim had no 
force in international law.85 The international community, including the 
UNSC, condemned Israel’s pre-emptive use of force86 as a violation of the 
UN Charter.87 Today, most countries condemn anticipatory self-defence 
owing to its propensity to invite abuse.88 Similar to the narratives of these 
states, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also substantiated the fact 
in the Nuclear Weapon Opinion, that the use of force in self-defence requires 
the occurrence of an armed attack.89 
76. Id. at 77. 
77. Id. at 78 (referencing Statement of Mr. Blum, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 
1981: 52).
78. David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack Condemned
by U.S. and Arab Nations, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/
world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html
[https://perma.cc/24LR-ZCKC].
79. AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 77–78 (referencing Statement of Mr. Hammadi,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 1981: 16). 
80. Id. at 78 (referencing Statement of Mr. El-Fattal, U.N. Doc. S/off/Rec.2284 (June
16, 1981: 6).
81. Id. (referencing Statement of Mr. Sinclair, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2286: 11). 
82. Id. at 78. 
83. Id.; see also id. (referencing Statement of Mr. El-Fattal, U.N. Doc. S/off./Rec.
2284 (June 16, 1981: 6); id. (referencing Statement of Mr. Sinclair, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2286: 
11).
84. Id. at 78. 
85. Id. (referencing Statement of Sir Anthony Parsons, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2282: 42). 
86.  S.C. Res. 487 (June 19, 1981). 
87. BELINDA HELMKE, UNDER ATTACK: CHALLENGES TO THE RULES GOVERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE 154 (2010).
88. CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 368 (2012).
89. Id.
48
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2. Analysis 
The present legal framework in Article 51 of the UN Charter clearly requires
that use of force is only justifiable in self-defence situations where an
“armed attack occurs.”90 Based on this explicit answer in the UN Charter, 
restrictionist scholars, including Brownlie,91 Dinstein,92 Henkin93 and 
Jessup,94 concluded the present legal framework does not allow the pre-
emptive use of self-defence, and allows self-defence only once an armed 
attack occurs.95 Counter-restrictionist scholars, including Bowett96 and 
O’Brien,97 argued that the use of word “inherent” in Article 51 meant to
include the pre-existing CIL of self-defence, such as anticipatory self-
defence.98 Therefore, according to counter-restrictionists, Article 51 itself 
allows anticipatory self-defence.99 The ICJ, in the Nicaragua case, clarified 
that the word “inherent” in Article 51 only applies to the occurrence of an 
armed attack.100 Similarly, the drafters of the UN Charter clarified that the
use of force in self-defence is limited to the occurrence of an armed attack, 
and does not include pre-emptive self-defence, by stating that, “[w]e did 
not want exercised the right of self-defence before an armed attack had 
occurred.”101 
Therefore, the restrictionist argument seems stronger, while the counter- 
restrictionist argument appears to be far-fetched and lacking evidence. As 
a result, today, most scholars and the international community consider pre- 
emptive self-defence unlawful102 because for them, pre-emptive self-defence— 
90.  U.N. Charter, supra note 3, art. 51. 
91. See  IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
275–78 (1963).
92. DINSTEIN, supra note 54, at 173–74. 
93. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 140–44 (2d ed. 1979). 
94. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 166 (1968).
95. AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 73. 
96. D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184–93 (Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc., Publishers 1958) (1958). 
97. William V. O’Brien, International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle 
East, 11 ORBIS 692, 698–99 (1967). 
98. BOWETT, supra note 96, at 184–93; see also O’Brien, supra note 97, at 721. 
99. AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 73. 
100. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27). 
101. NOAM LUBELL,EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 56 
(2010).
102. DINSTEIN, supra note 54, at 168; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 91, at 275; CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 133–34 (3d ed. 2008). 
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without the occurrence of an armed attack—is prone to inaccuracy and
has room for abuse, which is an excuse for aggression.103 For example,
there are two main issues with the notion of the pre-emptive use of force. First, 
there is a possibility that a state can miscalculate the threat and assume 
fictitious threat based on misjudged or faulty information/assessment.104 
Second, the international community has no way of judging the evidence 
beyond any reasonable doubt or ascertaining whether there was an imminent 
threat.105 
B. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
R2P is a principle allowing the unilateral use of force106 by a governing
state,107 other states108 or the international community109 to protect civilians
from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”110 
for humanitarian purposes. In this century, the UNSC has frequently relied 
on the notion of R2P.111 For example, the UNSC authorized the use of force
by upholding the principle of R2P through numerous resolutions including: 
1674 (2006), 1894 (2009), 1996 (2011), 2014 (2011), 2085 (2012), 2117 
(2013), 2121 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2149 (2014), and 2150 (2014).112 Similarly, 
numerous countries have also used unilateral force against other states, 
as humanitarian intervention under R2P without UNSC authorization or 
without the occurrence of an armed attack, through military alliances such 
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).113 
103. DINSTEIN, supra note 54, at 168; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 91, at 275; GRAY, 
supra note 102. 
104. DANIEL JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION 283 (2009).
105. Id. 
106. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 178 (2013).
107. GLOBALISATION, MULTILATERALISM, EUROPE: TOWARDS A BETTER GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE? 319 (Mario Telò ed., 2013). 
108. PROTECTING THE DISPLACED: DEEPENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 5 
(Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2010); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT 145 (Alex J. Bellamy & Tim Dunne eds., 2016). 
109. AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 49 (Gentian 
Zyberi & Kevin T. Mason eds., 2013). 
110. ALEX J. BELLAMY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A DEFENSE 2 (2015).
111.  See id. at 7–11. 
112. Id.
 113. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peace Through Law and the Security Council: Modelling
Law Compliance, in STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
255, 263 (Jeremy Farrall & Hilary Charlesworth eds., 2016). 
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1. Analysis 
The current legal framework says that any unilateral use of force is 
illegitimate if it is not undertaken with the consent of the host state,114 in 
self-defence against an occurred armed attack, or with UNSC authorization.115 
Therefore, any unilateral use of force under R2P without a UNSC mandate 
is illegitimate116 and is widely condemned by the international community.117 
The concept of R2P in the context of the unilateral use of force by a state 
is not unequivocally incorporated in international law, and lacks state practice 
and opinio juris.118 For these reasons, critics of R2P maintain that any unilateral 
humanitarian intervention without state consent, UNSC authorization, or 
compliance with the UN Charter is unlawful under international law.119 
Interestingly, a few scholars have noted that powerful nations have exploited
weaker states under the guise of R2P with the unilateral use of force,120 
and human suffering has increased, instead of decreasing.121 More conclusively, 
the ICJ has condemned unilateral humanitarian intervention,122 and has
established in the Yugoslavia case that unilateral intervention by NATO 
without UNSC authorization was illegitimate and posed a serious threat 
to the existing international law of war.123 Therefore, currently, unilateral 
114. Brian L. Job & Anastasia Shesterinina, China as a Global Norm-Shaper: 
Institutionalization and Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, in IMPLEMENTATION 
AND WORLD POLITICS: HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS CHANGE PRACTICE 144, 156 (Alexander 
Betts & Phil Orchard eds., 2014). 
115. Id.
 116. See BETCY JOSE, NORM CONTESTATION: INSIGHTS INTO NON-CONFORMITY WITH
ARMED CONFLICT NORMS 83 (2018).
117. See stances of Germany, Belgium and France in 4 OLIVER CORTEN, THE LAW
AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 542–43 (Christopher Sutcliffe trans., rprt. 2012). 
118. William W. Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME 34 
(Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2011). 
119. See Job & Shesterinina, supra note 114, at 156. 
120. JOSHUA JAMES KASSNER,RWANDA AND THE MORALOBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 147 (2013). 
121. Mats Berdal, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect, 
in THEORISING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 223, 224 (Ramesh Thakur & William Maley 
eds., 2015).
122. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 268 (June 27); see also GRAY, supra note 102. 
123. See ANA S. TRBOVICH, A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION
355 (2008). 
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intervention under R2P without a UNSC mandate is considered illegal under 
international law.124  
C. Unwilling or Unable Test (“the Test”) 
Ashley Deeks enhanced this test and expanded its framework in 2012.125 
The test contains several steps to define the legality of the use of force
against a state in an armed attack by an NSA.126 To begin with, it is important
to explain a few frequently used terms. For the purposes of this Article, 
NSAs include non-state actors, non-government organizations, national 
liberation armies, armed groups, terrorist organizations, rebels, and individuals. 
A victim state will mean a state against which an armed attack has been 
carried out by an NSA. And a territorial state will refer to the state where an 
NSA, that has orchestrated an armed attack against the victim state, is residing. 
According to the test, a victim state cannot use force against the territorial
state in an armed attack by an NSA if the territorial state is “willing and 
able” to curb the actions of an NSA.127 However, the test allows the victim
state to use force against the NSA in the sovereign territory of the territorial 
state in the event of an armed attack by the NSA if the territorial state is 
either “unwilling or unable” to curb the actions of the NSA.128 It is pertinent 
to note here that the applicability of this test requires certain prerequisites. 
For instance, it is mandatory that there be a victim state, against which an 
NSA has launched an armed attack.129 Likewise, there has to be a territorial
state, where the NSA is residing and from where it has orchestrated an armed 
attack against the victim state.130 In addition, the unwilling or unable test 
can be divided into four main steps: (1) seeking the consent of the victim 
state to counter the threat; (2) assessing the threat posed by the NSA; (3) 
assessing the willingness of the territorial state to counter the threat; and 
(4) assessing the ability of the territorial state to counter the threat.131 
124. See Job & Shesterinina, supra note 114, at 156; JOSE, supra note 116, at 83; CORTEN, 
supra note 117, at 497, 542–43. 
125. Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 488 (2012). 
126. See id. at 486. 
127. Id. at 487. 
128. Id. at 487–88. 
129. See id. at 487. 
130. See id.
131. Id. at 507. 
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1. Seeking Consent 
The first step of the test requires the victim state to seek the consent and 
collaboration of the territorial state to use force against the NSA.132 If the
territorial state agrees to the use of force against the NSA in collaboration 
with the victim state, then the next steps of this test are irrelevant133 because
the use of force against an NSA with the consent/collaboration of a territorial 
state is legal under international law, which is also recognized by the ILC.134 
Therefore, both states can effectively fight against the NSA without violating
the sovereignty of the territorial state.135 However, if the territorial State
refuses to consent or collaborate with the victim state, then the other steps 
of the test apply.136 
2. Assessing the Threat 
The second step assesses the nature of the threat posed by the NSA 
residing in the territorial state in order to measure the ability of the territorial 
state to supress the threat and to recognize the extent of the threat.137 This
may include assessment of geographical location, the penetration of the 
NSA in society, and the sophistication of the attacks and technology of 
the weapons.138 A more detailed understanding of the enemy and the threat
it poses helps in evaluating the ability of the territorial state to eradicate 
the threat.139 
3. Assessing Willingness 
If the territorial state refuses to collaborate, step three of the test requires
that the victim state assess the willingness of the territorial state to curb 
132. Id.
 133. QURESHI, supra note 2, at 103. 
134. See Stephen Mathias, The Use of Force: the General Prohibition and its 
Exceptions in Modern International Law and Practice, in 8 A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER: IN COMMEMORATION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE XIAMEN ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 81 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 2016); see also MYRA WILLIAMSON, 
TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST
AFGHANISTAN IN 2001, at 226 n.425 (2016). 
135. QURESHI, supra note 19, at 151. 
136. QURESHI, supra note 2, at 103–04. 
137. Deeks, supra note 125 at 521. 
138. See id.
 139. QURESHI, supra note 2, at 103. 
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the actions of the NSA.140  At this step, the victim state requests the territorial 
state to counter the threat posed by the NSA by taking appropriate measures 
against the threat.141  If the territorial state downright refuses to take any 
appropriate measures to counter the threat posed by the NSA, then the 
victim state can use force against the NSA in the sovereign territory of the 
territorial state to counter the threat.142  However, if the territorial state
accepts the request of the victim state to take appropriate measures against 
the NSA, then the territorial state may assess the ability of the territorial 
state to curb the threat posed by the NSA.143 
4. Assessing the Ability 
After the acceptance of the request, the victim state must assess the
ability of the territorial state to counter the threat posed by the NSA.144  To 
assess the ability of the territorial state, the victim state may evaluate the 
territorial control, military capacity, and plan of action of the territorial state 
to counter the threat posed by the NSA.145  If the plan of action of the territorial 
state is inadequate to counter the threat posed by the NSA then, based on 
the inability of the territorial state, the victim state can use unilateral force 
against the NSA residing in the sovereign territory of the territorial state 
to counter the threat.146 
5. Analysis of the Test 
The test seems reasonable on a superficial reading, and it allows ample
opportunity for the territorial state to curb the situation and counter the 
threat posed by the NSA. The test allows the use of self-defence against
an NSA residing in the territorial state.147 Moreover, the test allows the
use of force against an NSA even in situations where the territorial state 
is trying to curb the activities but is unable to do so.148 In all three situations, 
where the territorial state is willing but unable, able but unwilling, or 
unwilling and unable, the test allows the unilateral use of force against the 
NSA in a territorial state.149 It is pertinent to note, however, that the test
only allows the use of force against the NSA, and not against the territorial 
140. QURESHI, supra note 19, at 150–51; Deeks, supra note 125, at 521–22. 
141. QURESHI, supra note 2, at 104–05; Deeks, supra note 125, at 521–22. 
142. See QURESHI, supra note 19, at 150–55. 
143. See QURESHI, supra note 2, at 105. 
144. Deeks, supra note 125, at 525. 
145. See QURESHI, supra note 2, at 105–06. 
146. See QURESHI, supra note 19, at 155–58. 
147. See Deeks, supra note 125, at 487. 
148. Id. at 487–88. 
149. Id.
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state.150 For these reasons, the test raises certain key questions of international 
law. For instance, is self-defence permissible in response to the armed attack 
by NSA in the sovereign territory of the territorial state under the UN 
Charter or under the international law of force? Does Article 51 of the UN 
Charter allow self-defence against the actions of an NSA residing in an 
innocent state? Similarly, it is also interesting to note that nowhere does 
the test require the victim state to involve the international community or 
to seek UNSC authorization to intervene in another state to curb the threat 
posed by NSA, while allowing unilateral intervention against the sovereignty 
of a territorial state.151 
IV. PREREQUISITES OF THE APPLICABLE LAW TO THE TEST
As discussed earlier in Part II of this Article, the current legal framework
of using force is enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 51 provides an 
exception to the prohibition on the use of force: self-defence.152 Article 51 
permits a state to use force in self-defence only if “an armed attack 
occurs,”153 which was also discussed in detail in Part III under “R2P.” As
such, the test only allows use of force by a victim state where the armed 
attack has already occurred.154 But, the test allows the use of force against 
an NSA residing in a territorial state either where the state is harbouring 
the NSA or where the state is innocent.155  Therefore, before analysing 
whether the test constitutes CIL, first it is crucial to explore what an armed 
attack is.  Can an NSA carry out an armed attack? Is it necessary to attribute 
an armed attack to a state? Does the law allow the use of force against an 
NSA, especially an NSA residing in an innocent state? The supporters of 
the use of force in self-defence against an NSA residing in an innocent 
state argue that the victim state must be allowed to defend itself—no matter 
who conducts the armed attack.156 The converse argument is that such a
150. See generally id. 
151.  See id. at 506. 
152.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
153. Id.
 154. See Deeks, supra note 125, at 483. 
155.  Id. at 497. 
156. See Nadia Lerøy Brahimi, Extraterritorial Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors:
With Focus on the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine (Dec. 12, 2016) (unpublished Master’s 
thesis, University of Bergen) 
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use of force violates the sovereignty of a territorial state, which may lead 
to greater conflicts, and thus the main objective of law, to maintain peace,
is lost.157 
A. Armed Attack 
The term ‘armed attack’ is not defined in international law; thus, the 
prerequisites of constituting an armed attack are unidentified.158 However, 
the Nicaragua case requires that a state using collective self-defence is 
obliged to declare that it is being attacked, and is also obliged to seek the 
help of other states and the international community.159 It is also established 
among the international community regarding the use of force in self-defence 
that small border skirmishes do not amount to an armed attack.160  In the
Nicaragua case the ICJ held that: 
The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed
attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of
another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have
been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it
been carried out by regular armed forces. But the Court does not believe that the
concept of “armed attack” includes not only acts by armed bands where such acts
occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the provision 
of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be regarded as a 
threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs
of other States.161 
Likewise, support for an NSA in the territory of another state may 
constitute an armed attack,162 which is defined by the UN General Assembly 
as “organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife 
or terrorist acts in another state or getting involved in activities within its 
territory directed toward the commission of such actions that involve a 
threat or use of force.”163 
1. Threshold of the Armed Attack 
According to the ICJ, the armed attack occurs only with the gravest form
of the use of force, which is to be separated from less serious forms of the
157. See U.N. Charter art. 1; Brahimi, supra note 156. 
158. See AMOS N. GUIORA, MODERN GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY: STRATEGIES FOR
UNWINNABLE CONFLICTS 44 (2010). 
159. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶  197–199 (June 27). 
160. See THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
187-91 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2015). 
161.  Nicar. v. U.S 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 195. 
162. Id.
163.  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at pmbl. (Oct. 20, 1970). 
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use of force.164  The ICJ stated that “it will be necessary to distinguish the
most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) 
from other less grave form.”165 The court added that small frontier skirmishes 
do not constitute armed attack.166 The court distinguished between the 
prohibition on the use of force and armed attack, such that armed attack 
requires a higher threshold of the use of force for self-defence.167  The ICJ
restated this requisite for a higher threshold in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo v. Uganda168 and the Oil Platform case.169 For instance, in
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda the ICJ stated that only “large-
scale attacks” constitute armed attack.170 However, recently the doctrine
of “commutation of events” has been recognized by a few scholars.171 This 
doctrine entails that a small attack may not constitute an armed attack, but 
a series of small-scale events of the use of force may constitute an armed 
attack if they are weighed cumulatively.172 This doctrine is not part of 
international law as such, but academics have impliedly attributed this doctrine 
to the wordings of ICJ judgements in the Oil Platform case, Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Uganda, and the Nicaragua case.173 For example, 
the ICJ stated in the Oil Platform case that “even taken cumulatively . . . 
these incidents do not seem to the Court to constitute an armed attack on 
164. Francette van Tonder, Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: The Terrorism 
by Al-Shabaab in Kenya (Oct. 2015) (unpublished Master of Law thesis, Univ.of Pretoria) (on 
file with Univ. of Pretoria), https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/53201/ 
VanTonder_Self_2016.pdf?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/GU79-QUCV].
165.  Nicar. v. U.S 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 191. 
166. Id. ¶ 195. 
167. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in  THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 1–8 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013); 
See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Notion of “Armed Attack” in the Nicaragua Judgment and 
its Influence on Subsequent Case Law, 24(2) LEIDEN. J. INT’L L. 461, 463 (2012); see also
George Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Ch. VII Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (Brunno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
168. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 147 (Dec. 27). 
169. See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep.
161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6). 
170. See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda 2005 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 144–147. 
171. See TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ REQUIREMENT AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN
CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 168–69 (2010). 
172. See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 167, at 73; see also Barry Levenfeld,
Israel’s Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern 
International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 16 (1982). 
173. van Tonder, supra note 164. 
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the United States.”174  Similarly, in the Nicaragua case, the court considered 
armed attacks “singly or collectively.”175  
2. Attribution to the State
In several cases, the ICJ has established law on armed attacks by NSAs 
and the responsive self-defence against NSAs residing in territorial states. 
According to the ICJ,176 the UN General Assembly,177 and the UN Security
Council,178 NSAs can carry out armed attacks.179  However, only attacks
by NSAs of the gravest nature will constitute an armed attack in accordance 
with the true meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.180 However, the
ICJ also established in the Nicaragua case that the use of force by NSAs 
can only constitute an “armed attack” in situations where they were acting 
“by or on behalf of a State.”181 Therefore, based on the reasoning that the
territorial state was not responsible for the relevant armed attack conducted 
by the NSA residing in the territorial state, the ICJ rejected the right of 
self-defence of the victim state against the NSA.182  Similarly, regarding
the attribution of an armed attack to a state, in the Advisory Opinion of the 
Construction of the Wall case, the ICJ maintained that “Article 51 of the 
Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence 
in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.”183 Likewise, 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda case, the ICJ reiterated that 
Uganda had no right to self-defence against Congo, because the armed 
attack was not attributable against Congo but rather to Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF), an NSA group.184 The General Assembly also limits armed 
attacks to state actions, starting that an armed attack may be pursued also 
by “sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State 
174. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, 
¶ 64 (Nov. 6).
175. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 231 (June 27). 
176. Id. ¶ 195. 
177.  G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, art. 3(g) (Dec. 14, 1974). 
178. See S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
179. Nicar. v. U.S. 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 195 (citing G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, art. 
3(g)).
180. LUBELL, supra note 101; see also Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against
Terrorists, 20(2) E.J.I.L. 359, 369–70 (2009). 
181.  Nicar. v. U.S. 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 195. 
182. Id.
183. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinians 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 139. 
184. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J Rep. 168, ¶¶ 146–147. 
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of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein.”185 As a result, it can be established that the law allows
the unilateral use of force in self-defence against an NSA only in situations 
where the armed attack by the NSA is attributable to a state. In other words, 
the ICJ established that there is no self-defence against armed attack in 
situations where the state is innocent. However, in this context a very 
appropriate question arises: what about the justice for the victim state? Is 
the victim state unable to seek justice in respect of threats and armed 
attacks against its sovereignty by an NSA residing in an innocent state? 
The answers to these questions are available in the following discussion 
regarding force used with UNSC authorization. 
B. Security Council Authorization
UNSC authorization is another way of using legal force. Therefore,
Howard Friel and Noam Chomsky argue that all uses of force without the 
legal basis of self-defence or UNSC authorization are impermissible under
the current legal framework of the law of war.186 Articles 41 and 42 of the
UN Charter empower the UNSC to determine international threats to peace
and security, and to take appropriate action to restore peace.187 For these 
purposes, armed forces of member states188 and regional bodies189 can be
utilized by the UNSC.190 The UN Charter requires that, to be effective, UNSC 
authorization must not get any negative votes, known as the “veto,” from 
the permanent five members.191 However, Oliver Corten argues that the 
UNSC cannot intervene in internal state affairs,192 to police moral values, 
support social values, engineer economy, or enforce international law, without 
exhausting peaceful means.193 Nevertheless, the UN Charter offers a wide
margin of discretion that empowers the UNSC to determine for itself that 
what constitutes a threat to international peace and what does not, and to 
185.  G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 177. 
186. See generally HOWARD FRIEL, CHOMSKY AND DERSHOWITZ: ON THE ENDLESS 
WAR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2013). 
187.  U.N. Charter arts. 41–42. 
188. See id. art. 48.
 189. See id. art. 53.
 190. See id. arts. 43–46. 
191. See id. art. 27.
 192. See id. art. 2.
 193. CORTEN, supra note 117, at 322. 
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take appropriate action.194 The UNSC has authorized numerous uses of 
force against several countries, including Afghanistan,195 Iraq,196 Haiti,197 
Bosnia-Herzegovina198 and Rwanda.199 These interventions were authorized
for the reasons of humanitarian aid, the restoration of democracy, military 
purposes and the restoration of peace.200 Therefore, any state facing future
threats or that is attacked by an NSA residing in an innocent territorial 
state can use force in its defence with UNSC authorization. 
V. IS THE TEST PART OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (CIL)? 
While scholars suggest different origins for the “unwilling or unable” test, 
Ashley Deeks suggests that the test has its origin in the law of neutrality.201 
Deeks argues that force can be used in a neutral state to stop a violation.202 
But, according to the Hague Convention, the sovereignty of a neutral state 
is inviolable and responsive force against any attempt to violate that 
sovereignty cannot be considered hostile.203 Because the laws of neutrality
predate the UN Charter, and apply only to belligerent states, Gareth Williams 
rejects Deeks’s theory of the origin of the test.204 Instead, he argues that
the test has its origin in the law of necessity in CIL—that it becomes necessary 
for the victim state to use force if the territorial state is unwilling or unable 
to curb the threats.205 However, Anton Larsson argues that the test is only 
an extension of the current legal framework, widely interpreting the laws 
of self-defence and contending that the test is arguably a part of CIL and 
not a new exception to the prohibition on the use of force.206  Therefore, 
legally, the test also must be used as a last resort after exhausting all possible 
peaceful means, including seeking consent and referring the matter to the 
194.  U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. 
195.  S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
196.  S.C. Res. 1511 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
197.  S.C. Res. 940 (July 31, 1994). 
198.  S.C. Res. 1031 (Dec. 15, 1995). 
199.  S.C. Res. 929 (June 22, 1994). 
200. CORTEN, supra note 117, at 312–14. 
201. Deeks, supra note 125, at 497. 
202. Id. at 499. 
203. See Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons 
in Cases of War on Land, arts. 1, 2, 10, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 540 U.N.T.S. 654. 
204. Gareth D. Williams, Piercing the Shield of Sovereignty: An Assessment of the 
Legal Status of the Unwilling or Unable Test, 36(2) U. N.S.W. L.J. 619, 631 (2013). 
205. Id. at 639–40. 
206. Anton Larsson, The Right of States to Use Force Against Non-State Actors—Is
the Unwilling or Unable Test Customary International Law? 43 (2015) (unpublished LL.D 
thesis, Stockholm University), http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:854914/FULL
TEXT01.pdf [https://perma.cc/24JH-JHRS]. 
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UNSC.207 Deeks herself concluded that the unwilling or unable test “currently 
lacks sufficient content to serve as a restrictive international norm.”208 
Therefore, it is only reasonable to explore whether the test can be considered
a part of CIL.
CIL is described as “international custom, as evidence of a general state
practice accepted as law,”209 comprised of “state practice” and “opinio
juris.” State practice must be general and consistent, followed by overwhelming 
majority of states, without any contradiction or discrepancies in the practice.210 
Opinio juris requires that the practice be generally accepted as law with the 
sense of legal obligation.211 Applicability of the test has developed over
the past decade.212 However, for the sake of objectivity, this Article will
include instances of states using force against NSAs in innocent territorial 
states before the test had even arrived. Therefore, this section will try to 
explore state practice and opinio juris of the test. 
A. U.S. v. Cambodia, 1970
In 1970, the U.S. used force in the territory of innocent Cambodia, by 
relying on self-defence against the actions of an NSA, based on the allegation 
that Cambodia lacked territorial controls and was unable or unwilling to 
prevent future threats.213 This reasoning is strikingly similar to the test, 
except that the U.S. did not seek the consent of the innocent state.214 The
international community, including the USSR and the Djakarta Conference 
207. Id. at 14. 
208. Deeks, supra note 125, at 546. 
209.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1. 
210. Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur on Identification of Customary International
Law), Second Rep. on Identification of Customary International Law, ¶¶ 52, 55, 59, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014); Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International 
Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 666 (1953). 
211. Wood, supra note 210, ¶ 69; Larsson, supra note 206, at 9.
 212. E.g., Deeks, supra note 125; see also Kevin Jon Heller, The Earliest Invocation
of “Unwilling or Unable,” OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 19, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/19/
the-earliest-invocation-of-unwilling-or-unable/ [https://perma.cc/W69S-CV3U] (explaining
that the “unwilling or unable” doctrine was, to an extent, invented in 1970). 
213. Statement from John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to the 
NYC Bar Association, U.S. Statement on Issues of International Law in Cambodian Incursion 
(May 28, 1970), reprinted in The Cambodian Incursion: United States Notifies U.N. Security 
Council, 9 I.L.M. 838, 840 (1970). 
214. Larsson, supra note 206, at 18. 
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of eleven Asian countries, highly condemned the U.S. actions as an invasion 
of and aggression against Cambodia.215  
B. Turkey v. Iraq, 1995
In 1995, Turkey used force in the territory of Iraq against an NSA by
arguing that Iraq lacked authority in some parts of its territory, which had 
been used by the NSA to attack Turkey.216 The U.S. backed Turkey by
stating that Turkey was right to use force against Iraq because Iraq was 
“unable or unwilling” to curb future attacks by the NSA residing in Iraqi 
territory.217 Later, Turkey also stated that it must protect itself against the
“unable and unwilling” Iraq.218 However, it is pertinent to note that Turkey
did not seek Iraq’s consent, nor did it make explicit reference to its right 
to self-defence, and Iraq’s inability was mainly attributed to a no-fly zone 
created by the U.S., United Kingdom (UK), and France.219 With the exception
of four states, the international community, including the League of Arab 
States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Non-Aligned Movement, highly 
condemned the Turkish invasion and added that these actions violated the 
territorial integrity of Iraq.220 
215. Id.; Permanent Rep. of the USSR to the U.N., Letter dated May 8, 1970 from the
Permanent Rep. of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/9804 (May 15, 1970); Permanent 
Rep. of Indonesia to the U.N., Letter dated June 19, 1970 from the Permanent Rep. of 
Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/9843 (June 19, 1970). 
216. Larsson, supra note 206, at 19. 
217. U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (July 7, 1995) (statement of Nicholas
Burns, Briefer), http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1997/97-07-10.std.html [https://perma.cc/
F823-RKZB].
218. Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Identical 
Letters dated June 27, 1996 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of 
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1996/479 (July 2, 1996). 
219. Larsson, supra note 206, at 19–22. 
220. Id. at 21; Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the U.N., Letter 
dated Sept. 24, 1996 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1996/796 (Sept. 26, 
1996); Permanent Rep. of Qatar to the U.N., Letter dated June 2, 1997 from the Permanent Rep. 
of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/52/168-
S/1997/429 (June 3, 1997). 
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C. Congo v. Uganda, 1995
In 1995, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) used force against 
the ADF (an NSA) in Uganda without consent221 in response to armed 
attacks in the DRC by the ADF by relying on self-defence against the NSA 
based on the ‘inability’ of Uganda to control its territory.222 The ICJ in 
this case, denied the DRC’s right to self-defence, and instead referred to 
the DRC’s military activities as a military occupation.223 In this case, the
DRC argued that the actions of the NSA were attributable to Uganda. 
Interestingly, the fact that the DRC relied on perceived allegations to 
attribute the armed attacks shows the conviction of the DRC that self-defence 
was only applicable to armed attacks attributable to a state.224 Collectively,
the international community, including the ICJ, the EU, the Organization 
for African Unity, and the Security Council, condemned the DRC’s actions.225 
D. Russia v. Georgia, 2002
In 2002, Russia allegedly used force against Chechen rebels (NSA) in 
Georgia.226 Russia argued that Georgia was unable and unwilling to curb
221. Uganda initially consented but retracted such consent, which can be understood 
as unwillingness. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 196–99 (Dec. 19). 
222. Id. at 215, 219, 223; INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTH KIVU, INTO THE QUAGMIRE? AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN NORTH KIVU 7 (1998), https://www.africaportal.org/
documents/223/North_Kivu_Into_the_Quagmire_An_Overview_of_the_Current_Crisis_
in_North_Kivu.pdf [https://perma.cc/F823-RKZB].
223.  Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 214, 222-23, 231. 
224. Larsson, supra note 206, at 26. 
225. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 222–23; Permanent Rep. of Austria 
to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 12, 1998 from the Permanent Rep. of Austria to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/753 (Aug. 13, 1998);
Permanent Rep. of Namibia to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 17, 1998 from the Permanent 
Rep. of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
S/1998/774 (Aug. 18, 1998); S.C. Res. 1234 (Apr. 9, 1999). 
226. JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM 1945 TO 2003, at 256 (2004); Permanent Rep. of 
Georgia to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 23, 2002 from the Permanent Rep. of Georgia to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/57/341-S/2002/950 
(Aug. 23, 2002); Russia Denies Bombing Pankisi, While Georgia Claims Two Killed, 


















   
 




the threats due to its porous borders,227 and that Georgia ignored UNSC
Resolution 1373.228 Georgia stated that Russian activities were acts
of aggression.229 They were not aligned with any norm of the international
law, and they were a representation of a broad interpretation of self-defence 
under Article 51.230 This is a good example of opinio juris on the test. But 
the fact that Russia did not take any responsibility for its alleged actions 
in this case and condemned the test in 2014, casts some doubts about 
Russian conviction in respect to the test.231 
E. U.S. v. Syria, 2014
The most equivocal and recent example of the test in CIL was in 2014. 
On Iraq’s request,232 the U.S. used force against the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL, an NSA) in the territory of Syria under collective 
self-defence of Iraq.233 A year after using force against Syria, the U.S. 
explicitly stated that Syria was “unwilling or unable to prevent the use of 
its territory for [armed] attacks.”234 However, it is pertinent to note that
Syria was and still is very willing to fight against ISIL, but the U.S. never 
sought cooperation or consent of Syria.235 In fact, Syria is using force 
227. Russian Officials Again Call for Joint Action Against ‘Terrorists’ in Georgia, 
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Feb. 20, 2002), https://www.rferl.org/a/1142619.html 
[https://perma.cc/H56B-5LAT]; Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Russian Federation to the U.N., Letter dated July 31, 2002 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. 
of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/57/269-S/2002/854 (July 31, 2002); BERTIL NYGREN, 
THE REBUILDING OF GREATER RUSSIA: PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CIS 
COUNTRIES 120 (2008).
228. Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 11, 
2002 from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed 
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1012 (Sept. 12, 2002). 
229. Permanent Rep. of Georgia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 13, 2002 from the 
Permanent Rep. of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. 
Doc. A/57/409-S/2002/1035 (Sept. 16, 2002). 
230. Id.
 231. See Larsson, supra note 206, at 27–32; Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Who
Is on Board with “Unwilling or Unable”?, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM),  
https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable [https://perma.cc/2YFQ-
J5KU].
232. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 2014 from the Permanent
Rep. of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Secretary Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2014/691(Sept. 22, 2014). 
233. Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the 
Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. 
Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014). 
234. Id.
 235. Larsson, supra note 206, at 38. 
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against ISIL.236 However, Syria is unable to eradicate the future threats 
posed by the NSA residing in its territory because the U.S., UK, and other 
states have been illegally aiding and abetting non-state groups of Syrian 
rebels and other armed groups in Syria.237 
According to the test, the U.S. could only use force against the state in 
Syria. But the U.S. and coalition members not only used force against the 
Syrian state directly,238 but also armed Syrian rebels239 for the purposes of
changing the regime, which increased the instability and inability of Syria 
and goes against the framework of the test. Nevertheless, the signatories 
of the Jeddah Communique, the UK, and the Secretary-General of the UN 
have supported the United States’ use of force in Syria,240 whereas, Ecuador, 
Russia, China, Chad, Algeria, Brazil, Belarus, South Africa, India, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Cuba, Argentina, and Iran have condemned the U.S. and consider 
its aggression a violation of the sovereignty of Syria, intervention in internal 
affairs, a failure to seek the cooperation of Syria, and an act not in conformity 
with the norms of international law.241 Interestingly, the coalition members
236. Syria Army Pushes ISIL Out of South Damascus District: State TV, AL JAZEERA
(May 21, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/syria-army-pushes-isil-south-
damascus-district-state-tv-180521114538926.html [https://perma.cc/NMH4-ZVD8].
237. JOHN W. PARKER, PUTIN’S SYRIAN GAMBIT: SHARPER ELBOWS, BIGGER FOOTPRINT,
STICKIER WICKET 49 (2017).
238. Letter from Donald J. Trump, President, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
& the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-president-pro-
];tempore-senate/ [https://perma.cc/Q29P-HQ7L  see MARTIN S. INDYK, KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL 
&MICHAEL E.O’HANLON, BENDING HISTORY:BARACK OBAMA’S FOREIGN POLICY 179 (2012). 
239. PARKER, supra note 237. 
240. Larsson, supra note 206, at 35–38. 
241. See Press Conference, Press Briefing by Foreign Minister of Ecuador, H.E. Mr. 
Ricardo Patiño Aroca (Sept. 24, 2014), http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/general-assembly
/watch/ricardo-patiño-aroca-ecuador-press-conference/3806104847001/?page=3&sort= 
date&term= [https://perma.cc/T3G2-Z79C]; Press Conference, Briefing by Official Representative
of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexander Lukashevich (Oct. 23, 2014) http:// 
www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/
content/id/951814 [https://perma.cc/42MY-QXFS]; Press Conference, Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ 
mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1551073.shtml [https://perma.cc/NHU4-8N8K];
Olivier Corten, The ‘Unwilling or Unable’ Test: Has It Been, and Could It be, Accepted?, 
29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 777, 789–91 (2016); The Shame of the United Nations, SYRIAN CIVIC 
PLATFORM (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.scplatform.net/en/the-shame-of-the-united-nations/
[https://perma.cc/2YYE-KYBJ]; Alex Leff, Brazil and Ecuador Come Out Against Airstrikes 
in Syria, PRI (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:45 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-24/brazil-
and-ecuador-come-out-against-airstrikes-syria [https://perma.cc/4C2T-PHCR]; Heather
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did not refer to the test in their initial letters to the UNSC.242  Even UNSC
Resolution 2249 did not refer to the test or to Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
in calling upon member states to take action to curb ISIL activities.243 Since 
the UNSC is empowered to identify threats to the peace and security of this 
world and take any measures to curb potential threats, UNSC Resolution 
2249 can only be seen as UNSC authorization, well established under current 
legal framework.244 Thus, UNSC Resolution 2249 and the test cannot be
considered a change in the law of war. 
CONCLUSION
The main reason for developing the laws of war was to limit the use of 
force and safeguard the peace and security of the world.245 Under the current
legal framework, the use of force is completely prohibited except in two 
Saul, Syria Air Strikes: Iran ‘Says US Attacks on Isis Are Illegal’, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 23, 
2014, 4:20 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-air-strikes-
iran-says-us-attacks-on-isis-are-illegal-9751245.html [https://perma.cc/Y37P-5697]. 
242. See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated June 14, 2015 
from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/434 (June 15, 2015) (calling on the 
U.N. to take all necessary measures to maintain the regional peace and security without 
mentioning the unwilling or unable test); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission 
of Germany to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 10, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires of the 
Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec. 10, 2015) (stating the exercise of the right 
of collective self-defence without mentioning the unwilling or unable test); but see, e.g., 
Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent 
Representative of the United States. to the United Nations. addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) (stating that the U.S. initiated necessary 
and proportionate military actions in Syria based on the inherent right to self-defence 
established by the unwilling or unable test); Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the U.N., Letter 
dated Sept. 9, 2015 from Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015) 
(stating that Austl. was undertaking necessary and proportionate military operations in 
Syria based on the unwilling or unable test); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of Canada to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 31, 2015 from Chargé d’affaires a.i. of 
the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/221 (Mar. 31, 2015) (stating that Canada would act 
in self-defence in Syria based on the unwilling or unable test); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the 
Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated July 24, 2015 from the Chargé 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015) (stating that 
Turkey would exercise the inherent right to self-defence based on the unwilling or unable 
test). 
243. See S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015); SHERIF ELGEBEILY, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: TURNING THE FOCUS INWARDS 
69 (2017).
244.  U.N. Charter arts. 39–42. 
245. See U.N. Charter pmbl. 
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situations: (1) in accordance with the right to self-defence or (2) with
UNSC authorization.246 Therefore, there is no exception to use force
against the sovereignty of another state. That is why all the unilateral uses 
of force in the absence of self-defence or UNSC authorization are considered 
impermissible in accordance with the present legal system of the use of 
force.247 Yet, in the post-Charter era, including the twenty-first century, 
there have been some deviations from the current legal framework. 
For instance, under the guise of “anticipatory self-defence,” in spite of 
clear references in Article 51 of the UN Charter to the occurrence of an 
armed attack,248 states have argued that they could use force before an
armed attack had occurred within the meaning of Article 51 by including 
CIL if the attack was imminent.249 A few states even used force against 
other states by using this theory without the occurrence of an armed attack.250 
However, the ICJ, the drafters of the UN Charter, the international community, 
and the overwhelming majority of prominent scholars concluded that this 
notion is inacceptable in the international law of war because it allows too 
much room for abuse and violates the UN Charter.251 
Similarly, under the notion of R2P, numerous countries have also used
unilateral force against other states as humanitarian intervention through 
military alliances such as NATO, without UNSC authorization252 or without
the occurrence of an armed attack. The concept of R2P is also not unequivocally 
incorporated in international law, and lacks state practice and opinio juris.253 
For these reasons, critics of R2P maintain that any unilateral humanitarian 
intervention without state consent, without UNSC authorization, or compliance 
with the UN Charter is unlawful under international law.254 More conclusively,
246.  U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶¶ 4, 39–42, 51. 
247. See sources cited supra note 61. 
248.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
249. See BOWETT, supra note 96; O’Brien, supra note 97; AREND & BECK, supra note
36, at 73; Lietzau, supra note 62; Murphy, supra note 63, at 197, 207. 
250. See U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 8–12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 
12, 1981); U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 14–18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (June 6, 
1967); Shipler, supra note 78. 
251. See BROWNLIE, supra note 91; DINSTEIN, supra note 54, at 168, 173; HENKIN,
supra note 93; JESSUP, supra note 94; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27); LUBELL, supra 
note 101; GRAY, supra note 102; FOCARELLI, supra note 88. 
252. See O’Connell, supra note 113. 
253. Burke-White, supra note 118. 
254. Id.; Job & Shesterinina, supra note 114. 
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the ICJ has condemned unilateral humanitarian interventions,255 and 
established in the Yugoslavia case that unilateral intervention by NATO 
without UNSC authorization was illegitimate and posed a serious threat 
to the existing international law of the use of force.256 Therefore, unilateral 
intervention under R2P without a UNSC mandate is currently considered 
257 illegal under international law.
Several states and scholars argue that the test can be employed to use 
force against NSAs residing in innocent states as an extension to the right 
to self-defence.258 Similar to the current legal framework,259 the test requires 
that the victim state be a victim to an armed attack. It also requires that 
such armed attack be a large-scale260 and not a mere border skirmish.261 
Similarly, both the current legal framework and the test also concur on the
element that, like states, NSAs can also carry out armed attacks against 
another state, which can lead to the responsive use of force in self-defence.262 
However, the current legal framework and the test diverge in determining
the right to self-defence against NSAs residing in innocent states. The law 
is well established by several ICJ cases that there cannot be a right to self-
defence against a NSA in situations where the armed attack is not attributable
to the territorial state.263 By contrast, the test establishes that if the territorial
state is unable or willing to curtail non-attributable armed attacks, the victim 
state can use force in self-defence.264 This contradicts the aforementioned law
of international law, which forbids the use of force in self-defence against 
an innocent state in response to armed attack by a NSA.265 
255. GRAY, supra note 102, at 41; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 268 (June 27). 
256. TRBOVICH, supra note 123. 
257. See Job & Shesterinina, supra note 114; JOSE, supra note 116; Burke-White, supra
note 118; CORTEN, supra note 117, at 497, 543 
 258. Deeks, supra note 125, at 487–88. 
259.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
260. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 144–147 (Dec. 19). 
261. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 191–195 (June 27). 
262. See id. ¶ 195; G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 177, at 143; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 
178; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 178. 
263. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 24; see also Legal Consequences of Construction
of Wall in Occupied Palestinians Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 139 
(July 9); Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶¶ 146–147; G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 
177, at 143. 
264. Deeks, supra note 125, at 487–88. 
265. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 24; see also Legal Consequences of Construction
of Wall in Occupied Palestinians Territory, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 139; Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 
2005 I.C.J. ¶¶ 146–147; G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 177, at 143. 
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In conclusion, because of the test’s lowered threshold of the use of force
and its deviation from the current legal framework, the international
community has not yet accepted the test.266  While it may garner acceptance
in the future, states have been reluctant to rely on the test.267 Because the
test is seen as a broad interpretation of self-defence under Article 51,268 
the international community believes the current legal framework of 
international law of using force under the Charter is sufficient to maintain 
peace and security in the world.269 Thus, there is no room to reinterpret
the laws of using force.270 Moreover, the test has only been explicitly 
referred to once in opinio juris in reference to the conflict between the 
U.S. and Syria. However, there is not a sense of legal conviction among
the U.S.-led coalition members, as evidenced by the fact that no state 
referred to the test in its initial letter to the UNSC271 after a year of using 
266. Corten, supra note 241, at 777. 
267.  Id. 
 268. Id.
 269. Id. at 799. 
270. Olivier Corten, A Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence as a
Response to Terrorism, EJIL: TALK! (July 14, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-plea-
against-the-abusive-invocation-of-self-defence-as-a-response-to-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/
9TP6-GAF7].
271. See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated June 14, 2015
from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/434 (June 15, 2015) (calling on the 
U.N. to take all necessary measures to maintain the regional peace and security without 
mentioning the unwilling or unable test); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission 
of Germany to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 10, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires of the 
Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec. 10, 2015) (stating the exercise of the right
of collective self-defence without mentioning the unwilling or unable test); but see, e.g., 
Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent 
Representative of the United States. to the United Nations. addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) (stating that the U.S. initiated necessary 
and proportionate military actions in Syria based on the inherent right to self-defence 
established by the unwilling or unable test); Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the U.N., Letter 
dated Sept. 9, 2015 from Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015) 
(stating that Austl. was undertaking necessary and proportionate military operations in 
Syria based on the unwilling or unable test); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of Canada to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 31, 2015 from Chargé d’affaires a.i. of 
the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/221 (Mar. 31, 2015) (stating that Canada would act 
in self-defence in Syria based on the unwilling or unable test); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the 
Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated July, 24 2015 from the Chargé 
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force against Syria.272 Later, only four states made reference to the test
after changing their legal reasoning.273 Based on the unwillingness of the
majority of UN members to accept the test,274 inability to conclude legal
conviction,275 and inconsistency in state practice and opinio juris of this
test,276 it is evident that the test is not seen as a legal obligation and contains
several discrepancies in its practice. Therefore, it cannot yet be considered 
a rule of customary international law.277 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015) (stating that 
Turkey would exercise the inherent right to self-defence based on the unwilling or unable 
test). 
272. See Corten, supra note 241, at 777. 
273. See Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from 
the Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014); Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the 
U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of Australia to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 
9, 2015); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the U.N., Letter 
dated Mar. 31, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2015/221 (Mar. 31, 2015); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to 
the U.N., Letter dated July 24, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission 
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015); Corten, supra note 241, at 780. 
274. Corten, supra note 241, at 799. 
275.  Id. at 782. 
276. Id. at 780. 
277. Larsson, supra note 206, at 49. 
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